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ARTICLE 
AN INDEPENDENT PUBLIC LAW 
CARL TOBIAS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the most daunting task in law is seeing it whole, and in few 
areas is this more formidable than in public law. Professor Sunstein's 
recent critique, with suggestions for reform, of current standing doc-
trine enhances understanding of public law and contributes signifi-
cantly to the development of an independent public law. 1 One of the 
article's foremost virtues is its ability to forge linkages across public 
law by identifying phenomena that strike responsive chords in numer-
ous areas of the field. 
Certain of these phenomena resonate clearly in the federal judici-
ary's application of various Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal 
Rules) to public law litigation.2 Courts' revival of private law concepts 
and judicial hostility toward public interest litigants, such as civil rights 
plaintiffs, in the application of the Federal Rules, as with standing, are 
singularly ill-advised.3 The revitalization and hostility in the courts' 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. Thanks to Bill Luneburg and Peggy 
Sanner for valuable suggestions and to the Harris Trust for generous, continuing sup-
port. Errors that remain are mine alone. 
I. Sunstein, Standing And The Privatization of Public Law, 88 CO LUM. L. REV. 
1432 (1988). 
2. The phenomena do resonate in other areas, such as the "new due process pro-
tecting statutory benefits" as liberty or property, as well as ripeness and reviewability. 
See Sunstein, supra note I, at 1442 n.42 (noting statutorily protected liberty and prop-
erty interests assume constitutional status); id. at 1450 n.85 (listing developments that 
led to evolution of independent public law). Public law litigation is a lawsuit which 
vindicates important social values affecting large numbers of individuals and entities. 
For more treatment of public law litigation and the federal judiciary's application of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to such litigation, see Tobias, Public Law Litiga-
tion and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 270 (1989). 
3. See Sunstein, supra note I, at 1481 (concluding that questions of standing are 
for legislature, and revival of private law notions is inappropriate in context of adminis-
trative regulation). A public interest litigant is an advocacy group that pursues public 
143 
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treatment of questions in these two fields, as well as similar difficulties 
manifested in the judicial resolution of other public law issues, are part 
of a larger countermovement that threatens the relatively recent rise of 
an independent public law. 
This Article analyzes the application of numerous Federal Rules in 
public law litigation to show how the resurrection of private law ap-
proaches and hostility toward public interest litigants serves to disad-
vantage public interest litigants. The assessment is intended to discour-
age such future enforcement of the Federal Rules and analogous 
judicial treatment in other areas of public law. The Article is also 
meant to foster greater appreciation of public law and the articulation 
of a larger complement of public law principles so as to facilitate the 
growth of an independent public law. 
The first section of the Article briefly describes Professor Sunstein's 
article, emphasizing those aspects that are particularly relevant to pub-
lic law litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The second 
part draws links between the federal judiciary's enunciation of standing 
law and the courts' application of numerous Federal Rules to public 
law litigation. The third section evaluates the implications of these de-
velopments in the federal courts. The final section offers suggestions for 
developing a clearer understanding of public law and a more compre-
hensive set of independent principles of public law. 
I. DESCRIPTION OF "STANDING AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC 
LAW" 
In his article entitled "Standing and the Privatization of Public 
Law," Professor Sunstein initially explores the origins and development 
of modern standing law' by describing the private law origins of stand-
ing, the development of novel standing restrictions responsive to the 
perceived necessities of the New Deal, such as the need to protect 
agency decisionmaking from overly rigorous judicial scrutiny, and the 
creation of an independent public law of standing. 
Professor Sunstein explains that from the time of the New Deal until 
the early I 960's, the courts required that litigants possess rights 
equivalent to those recognized in the nineteenth century, such as rights 
derived from an interest in real property or contract, before they would 
law litigation or vindicates the interests of many people in administrative agency pro-
ceedings. The term includes groups or individuals that pursue civil rights actions, as 
well as regulatory beneficiaries, who are individuals Congress intends to protect from 
probabilistic or systemic harm by enacting statutory schemes for regulation. 
4. This and the next paragraph describe material in Sunstein, supra note I, at 
1434-42. 
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adjudicate a litigant's claims. This meant that entities subject to regu-
lation, such as members of the communications or airline industries, 
could vindicate their interests through the judicial process. However, 
the beneficiaries of regulatory regimes, such as individual consumers or 
people entitled to public assistance, could pursue their interests only 
through the political process. 
During the 1960's and 1970's, the federal judiciary and Congress 
rejected this private law approach to standing and the common law 
notions on which it was essentially grounded. 5 The federal courts and 
Congress began developing an independent set of principles of public 
law premised on the concepts that had initially led to administrative 
regulation, such as recognition that the free market could not ade-
quately protect many members of society.6 These principles reflected 
appreciation of considerations such as the relative efficacy of regula-
tion; the risks of administrative inaction, deregulation, and excessively 
rigorous governmental intervention; the potential for, and danger of, 
control by courts; and the proper functions of scientific and technical 
expertise in the administration of laws.7 Some of these principles sup-
ported the federal judiciary's expansion of opportunities for individuals 
and groups to sue in court and underlay congressional passage of legis-
lation expressly providing for litigation by its intended beneficiaries.8 
Since the mid- l 970's, however, the Supreme Court and certain lower 
federal courts have invoked private law concepts to deny standing to 
public interest litigants who seek to challenge administrative decision-
making that affects them adversely. 9 This judicial application threatens 
5. Federal judges relied upon the Administrative Procedure Act, which states: 
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled 
to judicial review thereof. 
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988); see Sunstein, supra note I, at 1440-44 (illustrating how courts 
interpreted § 702 to permit regulatory beneficiaries, such as television viewers and 
users of environment, to vindicate claims of administrative illegality). 
6. See Sunstein, supra note I, at 1450 n.85 (listing other developments pointing 
toward emerging independent public law, including new applications of due process 
doctrine, refusal to differentiate deregulation from regulation, and recognition that 
probabilistic harms were sufficient justification for regulatory intervention). 
7. Sunstein, supra note I, at 1432. 
8. See Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to Party Joinder, 65 N.C. 
L. REV. 745, 754-57 (1987) (tracing rise of "interest representation" model requiring 
agencies to balance all elements essential to just determination of public interest). 
Courts also eased restraints on public participation in agency proceedings, while Con-
gress required that agencies both solicit and consider citizen input, as well as provide 
for citizen involvement in administrative processes. Id. at 756-57. Cf id. at 748-59 
(explaining historical development prior to 1966 "liberalizing" amendment of party 
joinder rules governing compulsory joinder, class actions, and intervention). 
9. See Sunstein, supra note I, at 1451-61 (tracing return of private law approach 
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to resurrect the discredited distinction between the interests of regu-
lated parties and regulatory beneficiaries, precluding judicial relief for 
the probabilistic or systemic injuries that congressional regulatory sys-
tems were meant to eliminate.10 
Professor Sunstein finds that these developments can be practically 
comprehended as manifesting a private law approach to public law. He 
attributes this approach to judicial hostility toward litigation pursued 
by regulatory beneficiaries attempting to secure agency fidelity to those 
statutory commands. 11 He observes that the revival of such hostility 
would contravene a broad spectrum of case law pointing toward devel-
opment of an independent public law, would contradict Article Ill's 
language and history, would frustrate congressional expectations and 
understandings, and would improperly skew adminisfrative incentives.12 
Professor Sunstein argues that the revitalization of private iaw no-
tions "coexisting with administrative regulation" in the standing con-
text would be mistaken. 13 He suggests that courts defer to congres-
sional resolution of nearly all standing issues-especially when 
regulatory beneficiaries seek to overturn administrative agency determi-
nations that allegedly violate statutes enacted for their protec-
tion-essentially by asking the question whether Congress intended to 
create a cause of action. 
Professor Sunstein briefly alludes to related developments in other 
areas of public law apart from standing, such as the extension of con-
stitutional protection to statutory benefits like Social Security disability 
payments as liberty or property.14 However, he attempts neither to 
treat those developments thoroughly, nor to link very systematically the 
phenomena observed in the recent reformulation of modern standing 
doctrine to issues in other public law fields. In this Article, I shall at-
tempt to link those phenomena, particularly the private law approaches 
and hostility toward regulatory beneficiaries that are exemplified in 
standing, to the federal judiciary's application of numerous Federal 
Rules to public law litigation. 
II. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
During the last decade, many federal judges have applied a number 
by courts' imposition of requirements of injury, nexus, and causation). 
I 0. Sunstein, supra note I, at 1440-44. 
11. Id. at 1480. 
12. Id. at 1461-80. 
13. Id. at 1481. 
14. Id. at 1442 n.42, 1450-51 n.85. 
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of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in ways that disadvantage and 
often disproportionately affect individual regulatory beneficiaries, pub-
lic interest litigants, or groups that represent them, such as the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
or the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). Indeed, judicial 
application of some rules has limited these persons' and entities' in-
volvement in federal civil litigation or has had a chilling effect on their 
participation. 
The private law approaches identified by Professor Sunstein are ex-
pressed most clearly in the federal judiciary's application of two impor-
tant party joinder amendments to the Federal Rules: Rules 23 and 
24. 111 Enforcement of those two rules also may reflect hostility toward, 
or at least lack of solicitude for, some public interest litigants. None-
theless, these phenomena are manifested more clearly as to certain reg-
ulatory beneficiaries, namely civil rights litigants, in the application of 
Rules 8 and 11 16 and in the enforcement of rules pertaining to litiga-
tion financing, such as Rules 54 and 68.17 
A. Private Law Approaches in Application of the Party Joinder 
Amendments 
1. Rule 24(a)(2) 
Federal courts' application of Rule 24(a)(2), governing nonstatutory 
intervention of right, and Rule 23, relating to class actions, demon-
strates private law approaches. Rule 24(a)(2) requires intervention in a 
suit when absentees possessing a sufficient interest in the litigation will 
be both adversely affected and inadequately represented if the case pro-
ceeds without them and if a timely intervention request is submitted to 
the court. 18 The Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules and Congress 
"liberalized" that portion of the rule with a 1966 amendment.19 Since 
15. FED. R. C1v. P. 23-24. 
16. FED. R. C1v. P. 8, 11. 
17. FED. R. C1v. P. 54, 68. For a more thorough treatment of the federal judici-
ary's application of the Federal Rules analyzed below and of numerous other Federal 
Rules, see Tobias, supra note 2, passim. The application of certain rules may evince 
hostility toward litigation pursued by regulatory beneficiaries, or even toward the con-
gressionally created interests they seek to vindicate. These phenomena are impossible to 
prove, however, and what actually is happening seems more subtle and complex. None-
theless, application of some Federal Rules clearly reflects insensitivity to, or lack of 
solicitude for, regulatory beneficiaries. 
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). For a more thorough treatment of judicial applica-
tion of this rule, see Tobias, supra note 2, at 322-29. 
19. For contemporaneous analysis of the amendment by the Reporter to the Advi-
sory Committee on the Civil Rules, see Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Commit-
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that time, numerous courts and commentators have advocated its flexi-
ble application to requests for nonstatutory intervention of right, so 
that they have been rather freely granted.20 Those developments appar-
ently bear a close relationship, temporally and substantively, to the rise 
of an independent public law of standing, as documented by Professor 
Sunstein.21 However, during the last decade, a significant number of 
judges has treated the intervention applications of public interest liti-
gants and regulated interests in ways that disproportionately affect the 
public interest litigants, suggesting the revitalization of private law ap-
proaches analogous to those described by Professor Sunstein.22 
Many lower federal courts have applied the rule's interest criterion 
restrictively, requiring that applicants possess substantial, direct, and 
legally protectable interests in the ongoing litigation.23 In 1986, three 
Supreme Court Justices subscribed to a similar articulation, observing 
that Rule 24(a)(2)'s "requirement of a 'significantly protectable inter-
est' calls for a direct and concrete interest that is accorded some degree 
of legal protection."24 In fact, numerous appellate and district judges 
have demanded that potential intervenors possess interests that the 
"substantive law recognizes as belonging to or being_ owned by appli-
cants,"211 or have interests identical to, or in excess of, those necessary 
for standing. 26 Such interpretations make it more difficult for public 
tee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (/}, 81 HARV. L. REV. 
356, 405 (1967). See also Advisory Committee Note on 1966 Amendments to Rule 24, 
28 U.S.C. app. § 24(a) (1982). 
20. E.g., United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 984 (2d 
Cir. 1984); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967); 7 C. WRIGHT, A. 
MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1904, at 238-40 (2d ed. 
1986). 
21. See Sunstein supra note l, at 1451-61. 
22. The emphasis here is on regulatory beneficiaries' requests to intervene in suits 
between the government and private entities. Regulatory beneficiaries have been less 
successful than have private litigants who sought to intervene in litigation between the 
beneficiaries and the government. Of course, the comparatively liberal treatment of 
requests to intervene by private interests can complicate suits that regulatory benefi-
ciaries pursue. 
23. E.g., New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 
452, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984); Wade v. Gold-
schmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 185-86 (7th Cir. 1982); Westlands Water Dist. v. United 
States, 700 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1983). 
24. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 71, 75 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
25. Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366-67 
(I Ith Cir. 1982); accord Heyman v. Exchange Nat'! Bank, 615 F.2d 1190, 1194 (7th 
Cir. 1980). 
26. See United States v. 39.36 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859-60 (7th Cir. 
1985) (holding there is qualitative difference between "interest" and "direct, significant 
legally protectable interest," and, thus, to intervene, interest of proposed intervenor 
must be greater than interest sufficient to satisfy standing requirement), cert. denied, 
476 U.S. 1108 (1986); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 
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interest litigants to satisfy the interest condition. The kind of general or 
intangible "public" interest, such as that in a pristine environment, 
which large numbers of people share and public interest litigants often 
champion, will appear less palpable than an individual, concrete "pri-
vate" interest, such as a manufacturer's piece of real property.27 
Much said about the interest requirement applies to the rule's second 
component, that potential intervenors' interests be prejudiced as a prac-
tical matter. 28 For example, the types of interests, like those in con-
sumer protection, that public interest litigants typically advocate are 
less likely to seem impaired than a private interest in a contract. 
When enforcing the rule's requirement that applicants' interests not 
be adequately represented by parties to the litigation, judges generally 
have demonstrated greater willingness to find the government litigant 
an adequate representative of public interest litigants than of litigants 
that are regulated entities, relying on the parens patriae doctrine, 
among other tests of inadequacy, to reach such results. 29 Some courts 
have even stated that the government could fully and fairly represent 
public interest litigants who sought to champion "public interests" but 
have suggested that the government would not be a sufficient represen-
tative of industry members that attempted to advance "private 
interests. " 30 
777, 779-81 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (United States Senator lacked sufficient standing to chal-
lenge protective order covering information that may have helped Senator decide voting 
issue). 
27. United States v. 39.36 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d at 858-59 (regulatory benefi-
ciary's aesthetic and environmental interest in protecting area for inclusion in national 
lakeshore was not cognizable; the only two interests in eminent domain proceeding 
were those of government in exercising eminent domain power and of electric utility in 
property being condemned). 
28. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (stating that test is whether "action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede" applicant's ability to protect its interest should liti-
gation proceed without applicant). 
29. For an'alysis of cases applying several tests of inadequacy which have had this 
effect, see Tobias, supra note 2, at 325-26. 
30. E.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d 141, 144 (1st Cir. 1982); cf 
Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1270 (7th Cir. 1985) (public interest litigant's assertion 
of essentially "personal" interests is insufficient ground for intervention). For analysis 
of the rule's fourth requirement, timeliness, and how its application has disadvantaged 
regulatory beneficiaries, see Tobias, supra note 2, at 327. 
Some judges have applied Rule 24 in ways that are more responsive to the benefi-
ciaries and that evince an appreciation of the need for a "public law vision" of the rules 
and for an independent public law. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 
821, 826 (9th Cir. 1986) (Rule 24 should be broadly construed in favor of applicants 
seeking intervention), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Stringfellow v. Concerned 
Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987); United States v. 39.36 Acres of Land, 754 
F.2d 855, 861 (7th Cir. 1985) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (arguing concerns for aesthetics 
and environment are legally protectable interests through which intervention is justi-
fied); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D. Minn. 1972) (hold-
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In short, numerous courts' application of Rule 24(a)(2) effectively 
requires that public interest litigants possess interests akin to nine-
teenth century private rights before they can intervene of right. Essen-
tially, courts have afforded representatives of the public interest less 
judicial protection than they have offered regulated entities. 
2. Rule 23 
Similar private law approaches seem to be present in courts' enforce-
ment of Rule 23. Rule 23 states that a lawsuit can proceed as a class 
action when a court determines that plaintiffs are numerous and that 
their claims have common characteristics, that the claim of the individ-
ual pursuing the case is typical, and that the individual will adequately 
represent the class. 31 
The class action mechanism is the classic device for facilitating pub-
lic law litigation. Nonetheless, the number of class actions filed has 
decreased dramatically since the mid-1970's. This development is at-
tributable in part to the federal judiciary's restrictive interpretations of 
Rule 23. 32 
Most pertinently for the purpose of this analysis, the Supreme Court 
has essentially adopted a private law approach to class actions by con-
sidering class members and representatives as traditional individual 
claimants when assessing questions of standing, notice, amount in con-
troversy, and representatives' authority.33 For example, in Eisen v. Car-
ing interest requirement under Rule 24, in context of environmental cases, should be 
viewed as inclusionary rather than exclusionary device). Ironically, numerous courts 
have evidenced such appreciation when enunciating a "public rights exception" to an-
other party joinder amendment, Rule 19, one of few Federal Rules applied in a manner 
that is solicitous of regulatory beneficiaries. See Conner v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521, 
1538-42 (9th Cir. 1988) (denying gas and oil lessees' motion to dismiss suit under Rule 
19, because public interest organization that brought litigation was not purporting to 
adjudicate rights of current lessees, but merely seeking public right to administrative 
compliance with statute). For a full analysis, see Tobias, supra note 2, at 330-31. 
31. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a) (class actions must satisfy following criteria: 1) class 
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 2) there are questions of 
law or fact common to class; 3) claims or defenses of representative parties are typical 
of claims or defenses of class; 4) representative parties will fairly and adequately pro-
tect interests of class). For a more thorough treatment of judicial application of Rule 
23, see Tobias, supra note 2, at 319-22. 
32. For a discussion of the 1966 amendment and its subsequent checkered career, 
see Miller, Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth. Reality and the "Class 
Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979). See also The Rise and Fall of the 
Class Action Lawsuit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1988, at Cl, col. l ("[C]ivil rights class 
actions have declined ... from 1,586 in 1975 to 798 in 1985 to 185 in 1987"). 
33. See Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 4 (1982) (discussing how Court has tried to impose private law standards of 
standing, notice, and amount in controversy to public Jaw class action suits). 
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lisle & Jacque/in, 34 the Court imposed personal notice requirements on 
an individual plaintiff which were so financially burdensome that the 
Court could have undermined the efficacy of the small class device in 
federal question cases. 311 
In sum, private law concepts similar to those that Professor Sunstein 
detects in standing doctrine are clearly displayed in federal courts' en-
forcement of nonstatutory intervention of right and class actions. The 
application of Rules 24(a)(2) and 23 also may evince lack of concern 
for specific public interest litigants. These ideas, at least as to civil 
rights litigants, however, are more clearly expressed in enforcement of 
Rules 8 and 11 and those pertaining to litigation financing. 
B. Lack of Solicitude in Application of Rules 8 and 11 and Rules 
Relating to Litigation Financing 
J. Rule 8 
Rule 8, relating to pleading, requires the plaintiff to tender a "short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief. " 36 The rule, as originally promulgated in 1938, was meant to 
clarify prior pleading practice and to deemphasize the importance of 
pleadings.37 In 1957, the Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on the 
Federal Rules' flexible, liberal pleading scheme, countenancing notice 
pleading and repudiating fact pleading.38 Although it might seem that 
the Court's pronouncements would have ended pleading practice, all of 
the circuits now enunciate a "requirement of particularity in pleading 
for civil rights complaints," and federal district courts have granted 
34. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
35. In some cases, however, the Court has recognized the value of class actions as 
mechanisms for treating "injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government." 
See Deposit Guaranty Nat'I Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) ("(W]here it is 
not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multi-
plicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any 
effective redress unless they employ the class-action device"); accord United States 
Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 403 (1980) ("The imperatives of a dispute 
capable of judicial resolution are sharply presented issues in a concrete factual setting 
and self-interested parties vigorously advocating opposing positions .... [T]hese ele-
ments can exist with respect to the class certification issue notwithstanding the fact 
that the named plaintiff's claim on the merits has expired"). 
36. FEo. R. C1v. P. 8(a). For a more thorough treatment of the judicial application 
of Rule 8, see Tobias, supra note 2, at 296-301. 
37. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 440 (1986). 
38. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (all rule requires of pleadings is 
that there be "short and plain statement of the claim" that will give the defendant 
notice of what plaintiff's claim is and grounds upon which it rests). 
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motions to dismiss against civil rights plaintiffs whose pleadings are 
inadequate.39 
The elevated standards imposed on civil rights plaintiffs have been 
variously phrased and characterized. Many judges have found insuffi-
cient civil rights complaints which make general, conclusory, or specu-
lative assertions, and these judges have required factual specificity 
about defendants' conduct, concentrating on assertions regarding intent 
and motive.40 A number of courts have been even more demanding. 
Many judges have required some factual showing of actual intent to 
discriminate or that claims be supported with references to material 
facts. 41 Other courts have scrutinized complaints to ascertain if plain-
tiffs appear able to prove their factual assertions and have dismissed 
those pleadings found to be deficient.42 
The imposition of stricter pleading requirements upon civil rights 
plaintiffs has had detrimental consequences. When a judge dismisses a 
complaint at the pleading stage because of doubt about a civil rights 
plaintiff's eventual success on the merits, the court requires that plain-
tiff to collect evidence before discovery to which the plaintiff is entitled. 
Requiring such strict pleading contravenes traditional learning about 
what information a judge may consider and what material a plaintiff 
might be able to secure at that preliminary stage.43 It means that nu-
39. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d I, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding plaintiffs who 
fail to allege any specific facts to support claim of unconstitutional motive cannot ex-
pect to involve government actors in protracted discovery and trial), cert. denied, 470 
U.S. 937 (1984); accord Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1479 (5th Cir. 1985) (requir-
ing claimant to state specific facts, not merely conclusory allegations). 
40. See, e.g., Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (upholding district court's dismissal of discrimination complaint because al-
legations were conclusory and unsupported by any facts); United States v. City of Phil-
adelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 205 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding vague, inconsistent allegations of 
racial discrimination in administration of certain federally funded programs were insuf-
ficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted). 
41. See Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33-34 (!st Cir. 1977) (holding com-
plaint must state, with specificity, material facts that show existence and scope of al-
leged conspiracy), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978); Parish v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating appellant has burden of 
proving actual intent of discrimination against some clearly defined suspect class). 
42. See, e.g., Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 650 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (holding proposed amended complaint would still lead to dismissal, because 
court failed to find any facts that would support allegation of constitutional injury 
based on race); Albany Welfare Rights Org. Day Care Center, Inc. v. Schreck, 463 
F.2d 620, 623-24 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating facts alleged in complaint fail to support 
allegation of retaliation by defendant), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973). 
43. See Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F.Supp. 455, 460 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (stating 
that court is "at a loss as to how any plaintiff, including a civil rights plaintiff, is 
supposed to allege with specificity prior to discovery, acts to which he or she personally 
was not exposed, but which provide evidence necessary to sustain the plaintiff's claim .. 
. . "); Hill v. City of Atlanta, 91 F.R.D. 528, 532 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (high standard left 
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merous civil rights actions have been improperly dismissed earlier in 
the litigation process than they otherwise might. 
Thus, although it is impossible to prove that the adoption of height-
ened pleading standards evidences hostility toward civil rights plain-
tiffs, it clearly evinces lack of solicitude for them. The elevated require-
ments impose on one category of cases, and a single group of litigants, 
more burdensome standards based on dubious authority•• and question-
able factual premises about the relative validity or frivolous nature of 
certain types of lawsuits.46 The effect of demanding greater specificity 
is all the more striking when it is remembered, first, that both the Su-
preme Court and Congress have proclaimed civil rights cases to be fun-
damental to liberty and deserving of special solicitude and, second, that 
the use of less draconian mechanisms than heightened pleading re-
quirements, such as Rule 56, can be nearly as efficacious in terminating 
meritless claims.46 
2. Rule 11 
Courts' enforcement of amended Rule 11 demonstrates a similar lack 
of concern for, if not antipathy toward, civil rights plaintiffs.47 That 
plaintiff with "all but impossible" task of proving his case before period of discovery 
delineated by Federal Rules). See also Marcus, supra note 37, at 463-70 (discussing 
courts' commonplace practice of holding conclusory allegations insufficient to state 
claim). 
44. See, e.g., Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 923-27 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(Gibbons, J., dissenting) (arguing heightened pleadings standard motivated by hostility 
toward asserting civil rights against "authority figures"). 
45. For cases espousing questionable factual premises, see Jones v. Community Re-
development Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984); Albany Welfare Rights Org. 
Day Care Center v. Schreck, 463 F.2d at 622; Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 
F.2d at 922 (quoting Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960 (D. Conn. 1968)). For 
challenges to the validity of the proposition that there are too many frivolous civil 
rights cases, see Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d at 927 (Gibbons, J., dissent-
ing); Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights Complaints: A Step Forward 
or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REV. 677, 688 (1984). 
46. For Supreme Court pronouncements, see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 
(I 977); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). For substantive, proce-
dural, and fee-shifting statutes indicating that civil rights cases deserve special solici-
tude, see Tobias, supra note 2, at 284-85. For the propositions that increased use of 
Rule 56 could be as efficacious as heightened pleadings, but that its application may 
pose some difficulties, see Tobias, supra note 2, at 300. Some judges have applied Rule 
8 in ways that are more responsive to regulatory beneficiaries. See, e.g., United States 
v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 211-13 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that in civil rights claims against public officials, trial courts should not limit 
their consideration to complaint when later submissions may allege requisite facts). 
47. For a more thorough treatment of judicial application of amended Rule 11, see 
Tobias, supra note 2, at 301-10; Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 485 (1989). 
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rule, which had fallen into disuse since its 1938 promulgation, was re-
vised in 1983 to curb litigation abuse and in response to the litigation 
explosion.48 It requires that courts impose sanctions upon attorneys and 
litigants who fail to perform reasonable legal inquiries and factual in-
vestigations before filing papers.49 
Recently collected data on reported opinions issued since 1983 show 
that sanctions have been requested from, and granted against, litigants 
who bring civil rights cases much more frequently than civil rights de-
fendants. Moreover, civil rights plaintiffs have been sanctioned at a 
considerably higher rate than plaintiffs in all additional types of civil 
lawsuits.5° Courts have applied the requirement of reasonable prefiling 
legal inquiry with vigor against civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys in 
numerous cases which have been described as "very close,"61 although 
judges in general have treated this requirement generously.52 
Courts also have strictly enforced the Rule's requirement of reasona-
ble prefiling factual investigation in civil rights actions, finding plain-
tiffs in violation who filed civil rights cases that were dismissed, even 
though considerable information necessary to stating a claim would 
have been available only upon discovery.53 Judges have levied relatively 
few large awards against civil rights litigants. Nevertheless, the pros-
pect of satellite litigation involving refined questions of the amend-
ment's meaning and the possibility of incurring sanctions can prevent 
48. Rule 11 was part of a package of amendments relating to the pre-trial process, 
discovery, and attorney accountability. See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983). For discussion of the developments that led to these 
amendments and descriptions of the amendments, see Tobias, supra note 8, at 748-59. 
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. 
50. See s. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIR-
CUIT TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1989). Nelken, 
Sanctions Under Amended Rule I I-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Be-
tween Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1327 (1986); Vairo, Rule 
ll: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200-201 (1988) (studies disclosing that civil 
rights cases are disfavored compared to other cases). 
51. See Vairo, supra note 50, at 205, 217; cf C. SHAFFER & P. SANDLER, SANC-
TIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS 14 (2d ed. 1988) (numerous sanctions cases could 
be classified as fact-intensive close calls). An example is Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing 
Serv., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985). 
52. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 308 n.232; Vairo, supra note 50, at 213-14. Civil 
rights plaintiffs have been sanctioned considerably more often on this basis than have 
plaintiffs in RICO, securities fraud, and related trade regulation litigation. See Tobias, 
supra note 2, at 304 n.207 (citing statistics revealing higher rate of sanctions against 
civil rights plaintiffs); Vairo, supra note 50, at 201. 
53. See Vairo, supra note 50, at 200-202 (stating contradiction between Rule Ii 
and discovery provisions of Federal Rules); Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing 
Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REv. 630, 635-37 (1987). This phe-
nomenon is also illustrated by the case of Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 
194 (7th Cir. 1985), affg 596 F. Supp. 13, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
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parties from pursuing litigation and deter lawyers from taking on cli-
ents whose suits need factual or legal elaboration or from aggressively 
advocating those cases they do accept. 54 
The implications for civil rights plaintiffs of Rule I l's judicial appli-
cation are similar to those of Rule 8. For example, the enforcement of 
Rule 1 I has effectively demanded increased specificity in pleading, if 
only to resist sanctions motions, and has chilled the enthusiasm of those 
who pursue civil rights cases while contravening pronouncements of the 
Supreme Court and Congress that civil rights actions should receive 
solicitous judicial treatment. 55 In short, many federal judges, when ap-
plying Rules 8 and I 1, have exhibited little concern for public interest 
litigants, namely civil rights plaintiffs. 
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have displayed a simi-
lar lack of solicitude for these and additional public interest litigants in 
interpreting several other rules that pertain to litigation financing. The 
financing of litigation is particularly important to public interest liti-
gants, because most of them have comparatively few resources for par-
ticipating in federal civil litigation.56 
3. Rule 68 
Rule 68 governs offers of judgment or settlement and the payment of 
costs.57 The rule was intended to promote settlement and to reduce 
lengthy litigation by compelling plaintiffs who refuse pretrial settle-
ment offers that are more favorable than judgments they recover to pay 
54. See Tobias, supra, note 47, at 505-06. 
55. For analysis of increased specificity demanded to repel sanction motions, see 
Tobias. supra note 2, at 308 & n.234. For discussion of the chilling effect, see Tobias, 
supra note 47, at 503-06. For the pronouncements of the Court and Congress, see 
sources cited supra note 46. Some judges have applied Rule 11 in ways that are more 
responsive to civil rights plaintiffs, evincing appreciation of the need for a public law 
vision of the rules and an independent public law. E.g., Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 
F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1990). See Tobias, supra note 2, at 306 n.219. 
56. Litigation financing also was implicated in the application just witnessed. 
Heightened pleading requirements disadvantage regulatory beneficiaries who have rela-
tively few resources with which to gather facts prior to filing, even when they have 
access to those facts. Correspondingly, rigorous application of Rule 11 could chill cer-
tain beneficiaries' enthusiasm for litigation because their lack of resources makes them 
risk-averse. For discussion of the beneficiaries' resources and litigation costs, see To-
bias, supra note 8, at 765 & n. l 05. 
57. See FED. R. Civ. P. 68. For a more thorough treatment of the judicial applica-
tion described below, see Tobias, supra note 2, at 310-19. That examination includes 
consideration of Supreme Court cases interpreting Rules 23(e) and 54(d). The opinion 
applying Rule 68 is only assessed here because the litigation financing issues it treats 
are similar to those in the opinion treating Rule 23, while the case involving Rule 54 is 
narrower in scope. 
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post-offer costs.68 However, Rule 68 fell into desuetude. From the time 
of its 1938 adoption, attorneys and courts believed that "costs" did not 
encompass attorneys' fees, so that the small sum at issue was inade-
quate to trigger Rule 68's invocation.69 Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court read the rule in ways that could adversely affect public interest 
litigants in the 1985 case of Marek v. Chesny.60 
The Court addressed the relationship between Rule 68 and the Civil 
Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976 (Fees Act),61 which recog-
nizes the need to promote worthy civil rights actions and the existence 
of resource discrepancies among parties by requiring that defendants 
pay prevailing plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. A majority of the Court con-
sidered Rule 68 "costs" to encompass attorneys' fees under the Fees 
Act and additional fee-shifting statutes defining costs as including such 
fees. This reading means that "civil rights plaintiffs-along with other 
plaintiffs" who refuse pretrial settlement offers larger than judgments 
they win at trial-cannot recover attorneys' fees for work performed 
after rejecting the pretrial offers.62 
The majority asserted that "merely subjecting" public interest liti-
gants to the rule would not "curtail their access to the courts or signifi-
cantly deter" their pursuit of litigation, finding neutral Rule 68's policy 
of promoting settlement of all cases.63 The Court did recognize, how-
ever, that its interpretation of the rule would require civil rights "plain-
tiffs to 'think very hard' about whether continued litigation is 
worthwhile. " 64 
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, delineated a number of detrimental 
consequences that the majority's approach could have for public inter-
est litigants.66 He claimed that the majority's substitution of Rule 68's 
58. Proposed FED. R. C1v. P. 68, Advisory Committee Note, 98 F.R.D. 363 
(1983). 
59. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. I, 20-21 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); pro-
posed FED. R. C1v. P. 68, Advisory Committee Note, 98 F.R.D. 363 (1983). The Advi-
sory Committee responded to the mounting dissatisfaction with Rule 68's disuse and to 
the litigation explosion by proposing amendments to the rule in 1983 and 1984. Neither 
attempt, however, came to fruition. For discussion of the amendment travails, see To-
bias, supra note 2, at 310-13. 
60. 473 U.S. I (1985). 
61. 42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1982). 
62. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. at 7-11 (stating congressional intent in Fees 
Act does not override Rule 68 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
63. Id. at 10. 
64. See id. at 11. The Court considered this effect consistent with fee-shifting legis-
lation, because those statutes make the degree of success the most important factor in 
determining fees. Id. at 11. 
65. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. I, 21-22 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating 
Court's opinion violates most basic limitations on Court's rulemaking authority). 
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mechanical inquiry for the Fees Act's discretionary approach, which 
considers reasonableness under the circumstances, would preclude 
awards for public interest litigants in some situations previously found 
appropriate. 66 
Justice Brennan also argued that reading Rule 68 to include attor-
neys' fees would produce a number of skewed settlement incentives. 
For instance, the rule's ten-day limit for rejection or acceptance of set-
tlement offers could force plaintiffs to accept deficient offers made early 
in litigation before they have sufficient information to evaluate them 
because of the substantial risk of having to assume post-offer attorneys' 
fees incurred.67 
In short, the Court's application of Rule 68, by creating uncertainty 
over attorneys' fees, could force public interest litigants, whose resource 
deficiencies make them risk-averse, to settle prematurely or even deter 
them from initiating litigation. The Court's lack of concern for these 
litigants could inhibit exactly that activity the Congress intended to fa-· 
cilitate with fee-shifting statutes: the vigorous enforcement through liti-
gation by private attorneys general of nonmonetary values, especially 
civil rights and constitutional and statutory commands.68 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF JUDICIAL ACTIVITY 
The federal court activity examined above has had many significant 
ramifications. The judicial treatment observed has made it more diffi-
cult for public interest litigants to institute, participate in, and win liti-
gation important to them. Furthermore, such federal court activity has 
even precluded their involvement or led to the exclusion of information 
and perspectives relevant to the accurate resolution of questions at 
issue.69 
66. Id. at 29. For instance, a plaintiff who recovered only slightly less than the 
proposed settlement figure could not automatically recover fees, even if the plaintiff 
had achieved a result very beneficial to the public interest. 
67. For a thorough discussion of such an example, see id. at 32 & n.48 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). Another example is the problem of comparing settlement offers made in 
monetary terms with nonmonetary injunctive relief that regulatory beneficiaries typi-
cally secure. Id. at 32. For a recent example of the difficulties this can create, see 
Spencer v. General Elec., 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1990) (disallowing all post-offer-of-
judgment attorney's fees for plaintiff who brought Title VII action against employer 
because court's final damage award was less than amount offered by defendant and was 
rejected by plaintiff as settlement of claim under Rule 68). 
68. Justice Brennan recognized these ideas in his Marek dissent and in another 
Rule 23(e) case. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 745 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that Congress intended fee awards to promote respect for civil rights). 
69. Some of the enforcement observed has had multiple effects. For example, appli-
cation of Rules 8 and 11 can chill the initiation of litigation and inhibit the successful 
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The judicial activity apparently has been more problematic for civil 
rights litigants, as witnessed, for instance, by the plummeting number 
of class actions, an important vehicle for pursuing civil rights cases.70 
In comparison, certain other public interest litigants-such as the 
NRDC-which challenge federal administrative agency decisionmak-
ing involving the environment, consumer products, and public health 
and safety, seem to have been affected less and to have assumed a rela-
tively institutionalized role in federal civil litigation.71 
When public interest litigants lose opportunities to commence suit or 
participate in litigation, there can be many detrimental consequences. 
The litigants and those members of the affected public whom they re-
present may be comparatively unwilling to accept and may have rela-
tively little confidence in governmental decisionmaking,72 while the fed-
eral courts may lose data or viewpoints they need to render the most 
accurate decisions. 73 These factors are particularly important when 
judges are attempting to complete the complex, delicate task of formu-
lating workable decrees in litigation seeking the reform of massive bu-
reaucracies, like prisons or mental institutions, as to which the ideas 
and cooperation of everyone involved will be vital to success.74 Another 
problem can be the potential reduction in governmental accountability 
for its actions. Citizens may be unable to correct past mistakes, or to 
deter future misbehavior, of bureaucracies which too often seem unre-
sponsive, insulated, or recalcitrant.75 Finally, and perhaps most impor-
conclusion of litigation that has been initiated. 
70. See The Rise and Fall of the Class Action Lawsuit, supra note 32 (showing 
decrease in number of civil rights class actions). The application of the rule also may 
be more problematic for individuals or small groups of people than for a public interest 
litigant, such as the NAACP. 
71. This certainly is true of the rules assessed, except for Rule 24. Indeed, much 
litigation challenging agency decision making today is at least "tripolar," involving pub-
lic interest litigants, like the Sierra Club; the government; and industry members or 
their representatives, such as trade associations, like the American Petroleum Institute, 
or conservative public interest litigants, like the Pacific Legal Foundation. 
72. See Cramton, The Why. Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in 
the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525 (1972) (arguing that broadened public 
participation will improve administrative decisions and give them greater legitimacy 
and acceptance); Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 
U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1422-24 (1983) (emphasizing value of public participation in 
resolving technological problems). 
73. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 329 (asserting that judges are generalists and may 
lack sufficient expertise, especially in technical areas, such as engineering). 
74. For instance, prison guards may best understand how the institution in which 
they work functions, and, thus, be in the best position to frustrate any decree's practi-
cal implementation. For elaboration on these ideas, see Note, Institutional Reform Lit-
igation: Representation in the Remedial Process, 91 YALE L.J. 1474 (1982). 
75. Government accountability is no mere abstract concept. See Winter, The Meta-
phor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1374-75 
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tantly, the judicial treatment has slowed efforts to develop an indepen-
dent public law. 
IV. NOTES TOWARD AN INDEPENDENT PUBLIC LAW 
A. Building an Independent Public Law 
The threat to an independent public law demonstrates that there are 
compelling needs for clearer appreciation of public law and for a more 
thorough set of independent principles of public law. An important way 
to achieve these objectives is for federal courts, Congress, administra-
tive agencies, and commentators to continue working on discrete issues 
in numerous substantive and procedural areas of public law, as Profes-
sor Sunstein has done so competently in his scholarship.76 These issues 
arise in many fields, such as public participation in administrative pro-
ceedings, standing, jurisdiction, venue, reviewability, ripeness, judicial 
review, and the Federal Rules' application to public law litigation.77 
Judges, Congress, agency officials, and commentators should identify 
problems, formulate solutions, and forge links across public law.78 The 
( 1988) (observing that six people died "while the legal system failed adequately to 
respond" to the claim in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), that 
chokeholds were unconstitutional use of force). For more discussion of accountability, 
see Furrow, supra note 72, at 1422-24; Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and Venue 
Reform, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 976, 986-87 (1982). 
76. See, e.g., Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 407 (1989); Sunstein, Constitutionalism After The New Deal, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 421 ( 1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Constitutionalism) (arguing for supervisory 
role of all three federal branches in reviews of agency action); Sunstein, Deregulation 
and The Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 177 [hereinafter Sunstein, Deregu-
lation]; Sunstein, supra note 75. 
77. This is not intended as a comprehensive catalog. Moreover, the emphasis in this 
list and in this section is on public interest litigants' involvement in courtroom litiga-
tion, rather than public participation in administrative proceedings. The difficulties that 
attend courtroom litigation are more problematic, and much said as to it applies 
equally to public participation in administrative proceedings. For analysis of participa-
tion in agency proceedings, see Cramton, supra note 72; Tobias, Of Public Funds and 
Public Participation: Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public 
Participants in Administrative Proceedings, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 906 (1982). For a 
recent, valuable analysis which focuses on courts' interpretation of "case" in many ar-
eas of public law, see Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REv. 227 (1990). 
78. I realize that the activity of numerous judges has threatened an independent 
public law and that a number of them are unlikely to apply the Federal Rules more 
solicitously to public interest litigants. Other judges, however, have evidenced apprecia-
tion of the need for a "public law vision" of the rules. See, e.g., supra notes 30, 46 & 
54 (evincing judicial responsiveness to public law litigants). That work should continue 
and expand. I also recognize that the Advisory Committee and Congress have evinced 
little interest in amending the Federal Rules in ways that would be solicitous of the 
needs of public interest litigants. If judicial application of the Rules fails to improve, 
Congress should scrutinize the Rules closely with an eye toward possible amendment. 
Congress also may want to revisit its prior valuable efforts in areas other than the 
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resolution of specific difficulties ultimately should lead to a clear, com-
prehensive public law jurisprudence and to the development of a thor-
ough set of independent principles, which could be efficaciously applied 
to issues that remain problematic and to new ones as they arise. 
Indeed, numerous principles should help to resolve questions in areas 
other than the fields in which they originally were espoused.79 For ex-
ample, recent judicial resolution of standing and intervention issues 
which have confused many, including members of the Supreme Court, 
and promising new scholarly work on the questions demonstrate an im-
portant need, and considerable potential, for articulating a more coher-
ent theory of parties.80 Such a theory could be applied to issues in addi-
tional areas that implicate parties, such as compulsory joinder and 
public participation in administrative proceedings.81 
The federal Constitution and statutes are essential sources of inde-
pendent public law. Congress clearly intended in much substantive, 
procedural, and fee-shifting legislation that public interest litigants vin-
dicate interests of large numbers of people in enforcing the Constitu-
Federal Rules, which federal courts have eroded. A prominent example is the Civil 
Rights Fees Act, which may now warrant amendment. Another example would be the 
procedural aspects of employment discrimination legislation, which were narrowly in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court in the 1988 Term. See S. 2104 (Civil Rights Act of 
1990), IOlst Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. SI08 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990). As to 
regulatory beneficiaries and standing, of course, one problem with the Supreme Court's 
constitutionalization of certain aspects of the standing doctrine is that some congres-
sional activity may be precluded. In short, much of this work may be relatively theoret-
ical and be undertaken primarily by writers during the short term. Nonetheless, legisla-
tive, judicial, and agency officials should seriously consider active participation in the 
work and its practical implementation, especially over the long term. For one example 
of what I envision, see Tobias, supra note 2, at 335-46. 
79. I realize that the articulation of generic principles having the potential for rela-
tively broad applicability may not be precisely what Professor Sunstein contemplated 
when he called for the development of more independent principles of public law. The 
idea of generic principles fits comfortably with his work, however, which seeks to enun-
ciate principles that apply to specific issues in particular areas of public law. See supra 
note 74 (showing need for reforms in public law so as to allow individuals who are 
aggrieved to provide information to tribunal that is critical to formulation of effective 
decree). Moreover, Professor Sunstein does explore the possibility of broader applica-
bility of such principles. See Sunstein, supra note I, at 1450 n.85; Sunstein, Constitu-
tiona/ism, supra note 76, at 474-77. 
80. For recent examples of the Supreme Court's ambivalence on these issues, see 
the majority and concurring opinions in Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986), and 
the majority and dissenting opinions in Martin v. Wilks,_ U.S._, 109 S.Ct. 2180 
( 1989). Examples of recent scholarly work are J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY (1978); 
Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE 
L.J. 718 (1975); Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. 
J.L. REF. 647 (1988); Winter, supra note 75; Burbank, The Costs of Complexity 
(Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463 (1987). 
81. This theory of parties operates at a somewhat higher level of abstraction and 
has somewhat broader applicability than the principles espoused below. 
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tion, in improving administrative decisionmaking, and in promoting 
governmental fidelity to statutory mandates that are often aimed at 
probabilistic or systemic harms.82 The fundamental congressional pur-
poses themselves may be considered organizing principles of public law, 
while they in turn can support numerous independent public law 
principles. 
One such general principle is that administrative agency and judicial 
decisionmakers should be solicitous of public interest litigants. Courts 
ought to afford their interests at least as much protection as those of 
regulated entities, perhaps, for instance, permitting public interest liti-
gants to initiate regulatory action when agencies have failed to act. 83 
Analysis of certain issues arising in several areas of public law, such 
as administrative decisionmaking, standing, and nonstatutory interven-
tion of right, demonstrates that public interest litigants' involvement in 
agency proceedings and courtroom litigation has fostered better admin-
istrative decisionmaking and promoted agency accountability, which 
leads to the principle that such participation should be facilitated. 84 
These public interest litigants frequently seek to prevent or redress 
probabilistic or systemic harms, thus prompting the principle that con-
cepts like "interest" and "injury," important to securing access to 
agency and court processes, be applied flexibly to take into account 
comparatively intangible values.85 For instance, citizens' interest in wil-
derness preservation· is likely to appear abstract and relatively un-
harmed when they seek to intervene of right in courtroom litigation 
over natural resource development between the government and the pe-
troleum industry. Courts considering these intervention applications 
should remember the comparatively intangible nature of the interests 
82. Congress similarly intended that the litigants foster agency accountability, de-
ter administrative misbehavior, and improve judicial decisionmaking. See supra notes 
72-75 and accompanying text. 
83. See Sunstein, Constitutionalism, supra note 76, at 474-77 (arguing distinction 
between reviewability for agency action and inaction creates incentives for agepcy inac-
tion); Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 76, at 212 (predicting regulatory beneficiaries 
will receive same protection as regulated industries). See generally Stewart & Sun-
stein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982) (examining 
judicial remedies available to regulatory beneficiaries and regulated industries). But see 
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (holding agency inaction unreviewable); Block 
v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984) (holding individual consumers may 
not obtain judicial review of milk market orders where such consumer participation is 
not explicitly provided for in legislative scheme). 
84. See Sunstein, supra note 74, at 986-88 (showing how courts have adopted "in-
terest representation" in reviewing agency actions); See generally Tobias supra note 77 
(arguing for reimposition of public participation funding by agencies). 
85. These ideas pertain principally to intervention of right but also have applicabil-
ity to standing. See Bandes, supra note 77, at 250-58, 311-14. 
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which Congress intended to protect from injury and, thus, should view 
broadly the interests and injuries potential intervenors claim while lib-
erally granting their intervention requests.ss 
Moreover, public interest litigants often attempt to vindicate the in-
terests of many people who are not participants in the administrative or 
courtroom proceedings. This engenders the principle that the interests 
of those absent be fully taken into account, if not formally repre-
sented.s7 For example, in institutional reform litigation involving the 
desegregation of public schools, numerous parents of school children 
who are not parties to the suit may differ significantly with litigants 
over the appropriate remedial measures. Judges should be certain that 
they have secured and thoroughly considered the perspectives of all in-
terests that might be affected by any relief ultimately granted.ss 
Correspondingly, work on some issues in certain of these areas and 
on judicial application of federal rules relating to pleading, sanctions, 
and litigation financing indicates that most public interest litigants 
have much less time and money to spend on participating in proceed-
ings than do the government and private entities.s9 This leads to the 
principle that decisionmakers should take into account parties' relative 
resources when appropriate.9° For instance, if courts find that civil 
rights litigants have failed to conduct reasonable prefiling inquiries and, 
thus, violated amended Rule 11, judges should seriously consider the 
parties' available resource for complying with the rule and their ability 
to pay in assessing the size of any sanction awards to be imposed.91 
86. For more analysis of these issues and suggestions for their solution, see Tobias, 
supra note 2, at 328-29. 
87. This implicates the requirements of Federal Rules 23 and 24(a)(2) that absen-
tees' interests be adequately represented, but it also suggests that decisionmakers re-
member these interests when rendering their determinations. 
88. For helpful discussion of concrete cases and the difficulties entailed, for exam-
ple, in creating representative party frameworks, see Bell, Serving Two Masters: Inte-
gration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 
470, 505-11 (1976) (detailing development of school desegregation litigation with par-
ticular emphasis on need to monitor differing interests of class); Rhode, Class Conflicts 
in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 ( 1982). For a valuable case example, see 
Bradley v. Milliken, 828 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1987). 
89. Tobias, supra note 8, at 765 n.105. 
90. I realize that this proposal is controversial and that courts frequently act as if 
all litigants possess equal resources, even though that ignores reality. See Hickman v. 
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). For analysis of these ideas and of parity, see Resnik, 
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 494, 516-20 
(1986). 
91. Rule 11 and its accompanying Advisory Committee Note authorize such con-
sideration. See 97 F.R.D. 198 ( 1983) (Advisory Committee Note); see, e.g., Cruz v. 
Savage, 896 F.2d 626, 634 (I st Cir. 1990). For examples of judicial consideration of 
financial hardship in the context of applying the party joinder amendments, see Coali-
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Many issues in additional areas of public law that implicate public 
interest litigants somewhat less directly can contribute to the develop-
ment of independent principles of public law. One prominent illustra-
tion is judicial review of administrative action. For example, considera-
ble evidence suggests that close judicial scrutiny has improved the 
quality of administrative decisionmaking that significantly affects pub-
lic interest litigants.92 This yields the principle that courts' review 
should be relatively stringent when regulatory beneficiaries challenge 
agency determinations important to them.93 More specifically, judges 
should attempt to control the exercise of administrative discretion by 
requiring that agency officials thoroughly consider the relevant statu-
tory objectives to be achieved and alternatives for attaining them and 
should require that agencies fully explain their decisions. 94 Concomi-
tantly, one essential purpose of judicial review should be to facilitate 
the identification and implementation of regulatory and public values. 95 
Another valuable source of independent principles of public law is 
considerable recent research exploring the meaning of, and values in-
herent in, modern agency and courtroom proceedings.96 Some of the 
tion on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382, 1386-88 (D.D.C. 1986) 
(increased costs of new litigation if case were to be dismissed because plaintiff is not 
joined as "necessary" party under Rule 19), and Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 
F.R.D. 448, 451 (D.D.C. 1978) (potential financial hardship to plaintiffs of requiring 
plaintiff to litigate case separately rather than joining all parties under Rule 19). 
92. Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 76, at 210-11; Tobias, supra note 77. 
Others have questioned this proposition. See, e.g., J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC Jus-
TICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983) (examining process of 
hearings and appeals in Social Security disability program); Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth 
About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239 ( 1973) (suggesting it is only wishful thinking to 
believe judicial scrutiny will enhance administrative process). 
93. Essentially, "hard look" judicial review should be applied in most public law 
litigation. For a full analysis of such judicial review, see Sunstein, Deregulation, supra 
note 76 (defining comprehensive rationality and comparing to "incrementalism," alter-
native model of policymaking). 
94. For analysis of these aspects of hard look review and the idea of "technocratic" 
or "comprehensive rationality," see Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative 
Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981) (suggesting judicial review will not be exercised 
properly when agencies fail to offer detailed explanations for their decisions); Sunstein, 
Deregulation, supra note 76, at 181-83, 187. 
95. Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 76, at 187-88. See generally Chayes, The 
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (I 976) (conclud-
ing close involvement of judge is inevitable if justice is to be done); Fiss, The Supreme 
Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979) (ex-
amining need for judiciary to give meaning and content to public values). 
96. See Burbank, supra note 80, at 1466-71 (cataloging recent research on values 
in courtroom litigation). The focus in this paragraph remains courtroom litigation, but 
for discussion of agency proceedings, see Cramton, supra note 72 (focusing on need, 
desire, limitation, and methods for broadening public participation in agency proceed-
ings); Furrow, supra note 72 (contending public participation, at least in area of scien-
tific decisionmaking, needs to be generated in order to ensure public representation in 
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work on the civil litigation process suggests that the values embedded 
in public law litigation are so important that the participants rarely 
should be forced to settle or be relegated to any of the comparatively 
informal, relatively private mechanisms for resolving controversies, 
namely measures falling under the rubric of Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution (ADR).97 For example, in certain types of mass tort litigation, 
such as those cases involving women seriously hurt by diethylstilbestrol 
(DES), many of the victims apparently consider the opportunity to tell 
their stories in a public forum equally important as recovering compen-
sation for the injuries suff ered.98 
Moreover, public law litigation generally is said to foster a sense of 
community,99 while in some specific public law cases the chance to par-
ticipate in the civil litigation process may empower poor citizens or dis-
enfranchised members of society. In certain public law litigation, the 
publicity generated may outweigh any substantive victory ultimately 
attained. These concepts lead to the specific application in public law 
litigation of principles said to underlie the 1938 promulgation of the 
Federal Rules: disposition of litigation on the merits by trial after op-
portunity for full disclosure through discovery.100 
agency proceedings). Cf Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Digni-
tary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 902-04 (1981) (stating participation is inherently 
desirable way of acknowledging dignity of persons affected by decisionmaking). 
97. See Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986) (examining dangers of ADR mechanisms); Fiss, Against 
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); cf Liebermann & Henry, Lessons From the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424 (1986) (suggesting 
ADR settlements are not preferable to judgments). 
98. This is Professor Finley's preliminary conclusion derived from interviewing 
many "DES Daughters." Interview with Professor Lucinda Finley, State University of 
New York at Buffalo, School of Law (Jan. 11, 1989). Cf Rosenberg, The Causal 
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984) (analyzing mass tort litigation). 
99. Sunstein, supra note 75, at 995 n.88 (citing early work endorsing communitar-
ian approach to litigation). For recent similar work, see Bone, The Idea of Adjudica-
tive Representation (1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Cover, The 
Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1983) (communities form through shared commitment to specific moral tradition). Of 
course, there are numerous other values in litigation not discussed or only alluded to 
here. See Michelman, The Supreme Court and litigation Access Fees: The Right to 
Protect Ones Rights-Part/, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153 (analyzing dignity, participation, 
deference, and effectuation values). 
100. Marcus, supra note 37, at 439. This is a paraphrase of Professor Marcus' 
characterization of the view of Charles Clark, Reporter to the Advisory Committee, 
took of the 1938 Federal Rules. Since the time Clark espoused his "liberal ethos," 
federal civil litigation has changed substantially, some believe for the worse or because 
of the liberal ethos. See Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 
MINN. L. REV. I (1984) (examining litigation explosion and offering reforms for ex-
isting system). Of course, considerable public law litigation seeking review of agency 
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Other sources of public law principles are work outside strictly legal 
disciplines, such as research in the fields of organizational theory and 
political science.101 Work which offers insights into administrative in-
centives and bureaucratic behavior could yield principles pertinent to 
the stringency of judicial review. Correspondingly, resear:::h on the dy-
namics of group litigation may lead to principles about how best to 
represent fully and fairly those who participate in such litigation.102 
B. Countertendencies 
Of course, these ideas are intended to be suggestions, rather than 
exhaustive recommendations, and much work remains to be under-
taken. Although I have assumed throughout this piece that the rise and 
expansion of an independent public law are positive developments, 
those assumptions have not gone uncontroverted, as the counter-
tendencies mentioned above indicate. Thus, there is need to address as 
systematically as possible the controversial, unresolved questions raised 
by federal judges and others about particular issues, such as the "liti-
gation explosion," litigation abuse, and judicial economy.103 
Expression of these concerns may reflect dissatisfaction with public 
interest litigants and the growth of an independent public law. Such 
responses to the litigation explosion and litigation abuse have unjustifi-
ably hindered public interest litigants and may have been part of the 
recent reaction against development of an independent public law. For 
instance, overly vigorous judicial enforcement of Rule 11 has chilled 
unnecessarily the enthusiasm of civil rights Jitigants. 104 
I do not underestimate the seriousness of additionally burdening an 
already overworked federal judiciary with frivolous cases or abusive 
action involves neither discovery nor trial. 
IOI. See, e.g., M. DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL 
THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986) (examining law's treatment of large 
scale bureaucratic organizations); M. Olson, The logic of Collective Action ( 1965) 
(analyzing development of group behavior and incentives to organize for collective 
good); G. Schubert, The Public Interest (1962). 
102. M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 101; Garet, Communality and Existence: The 
Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983); Rhode, supra note 88. 
l 03. Of course, there are numerous important unaddressed issues of public law 
other than the litigation explosion and litigation abuse which warrant analysis. Because 
the litigation explosion and litigation abuse remain controversial and unresolved, and 
because the issues are important to the future of public law and public law litigation, 
they are examined below. For a valuable early assessment of judicial economy in the 
intervention context, see Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Re-
sources: The Efficiency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701 (1978) 
Uustifying need for efficient rules of civil procedure specifically with respect to Rule 
24). 
104. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. 
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lawyering. Considerably more reliable data will have to be assembled, 
analyzed, and synthesized, before it will be possible to answer with 
much accuracy numerous questions that have not been satisfactorily 
resolved to date. For instance, how many filings, and of what kind, con-
stitute a litigation explosion? 105 What is litigation abuse, exactly how 
much is there, and how can it be remedied most effectively? 
Even if future, rigorous research clearly shows a sufficient increase in 
civil litigation to constitute a litigation explosion for which public inter-
est litigants bear substantial responsibility, would a mere rise in the 
number of filings necessarily be detrimental and, if so, would any new 
restrictions on public interest litigants be warranted? Correspondingly, 
were that research to yield a defensible definition of litigation abuse 
and to indicate clearly that there was too much litigation, for what 
amount would public interest litigants actually have to be found re-
sponsible before additional limitations could be deemed proper? In 
short, this is a recommendation that an independent public law not be 
eroded sub si/entio, for example, on the basis of anecdotal evidence. 
Any remedial action should be premised on forthright, careful consid-
eration of the real questions at issue after reliable data have been 
collected. 106 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article is an attempt to augment the work of Professor Sunstein 
and other writers, as well as federal legislative, judicial, and executive 
branch officials. It is meant to enhance understanding of public law and 
to forge linkages across public law by demonstrating that the 
countertendencies detected in the area of standing are not isolated. As 
Professor Sunstein admonishes, developing a "set of independent prin-
ciples of public law is a large task indeed." 107 The valuable work of 
constructing those principles, however, must continue to be pursued 
vigorously and expanded. Failing to do so would have detrimental im-
105. For citation to numerous authorities that challenge the existence of a litigation 
explosion, see Tobias, supra note 2, at 288-89; cf Eisenberg & Schwab. The Reality of 
Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 642-43 (1987) (reporting 
national data and research about important federal district courts that suggests image 
of civil rights litigation explosion is overstated and borders on myth); Galanter, The 
Life and Times of the Big Six: or, The Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 
Wis. L. REV. 921 (finding business contract cases contribute to so-called litigation 
explosion). 
106. See Edwards, The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Profession, 38 J. 
LEGAL Eouc. 285, 291-92 (1988); Fiss, supra note 97, at I 087-90; Resnik, supra note 
90. 
I 07. Sunstein, supra note I, at 1480. 
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plications far beyond the doctrine of standing, perhaps permitting the 
countermovement to gain momentum and even jeopardize an indepen-
dent public law. 
